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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
B.6ILMEN'r-ARTISAN's Ln:N -Sr:LL1NG AuTOMOBIL'S Tm-es. -Appellee
sought to enforce a lien on three touring cars for the price of eight casings
sold and fitted on them by him. No charge was made for taking off the old
casings and putting on the new ones. TP,e lien was based on the statute
giving a lien to wheelwrights who performed work and labor on carriages,
wagons, farm implements, and other articles for such work and labor, and
for all materials furnished by them and used in such product or repairs.
Acrs oF ARKANSAS, 1903, p. 26o. Held, (one judge dissenting), the taking
off of old casings and putting on new ones is merely an incident of the business of selling tires not constituting plaintiff a "wheelwright". Weber Implement and Automobile Co. v. Pearson, (Ark., 1918), 200 S. W. 273.
An automobile repairer is a wheelwright within the meaning of the statute.
Shelton v. Little Rock Auto Co., 103 Ark. 142. At common law every bailee
or mechanic who by his labor and skill imparts an additional value to the
goods has a lien upon the property for his reasonable charges. "This includes all such mechanics, tradesmen and laborers as receive property for
the purpose of repairing or otherwise improving its condition." Grinnell v.
Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 485. The objection that the garage is the modern substitute of the ancient livery stable and that therefore the owner has the right
reserved to use the machine at his pleasure thereby disturbing continuous
possession which is essential to a lien at common law is wiped out by many
of the statutes. Smith v. O'Brien, 46 Misc. (N. Y.) 325. By these.statutes
continuous possession is not necessary to preserve the lien. Lowe Auto. Co.
v. Winkler, 127 Ark. 433. The purpose of the statutes seems to be to extend
the lien to those mechanics who had no lien at common law and they are
therefore an extension of the common law doctrine, and not in derogation
of it, which should warrant a liberal interpretation. In Kansas City Automobile School Co. v. Holcker-Elberg Mfg. Co., (Mo. App., lgo6), 182 S. W.
759, it was held the defendant was entitled to a lien for a body sold and
fitted on the framework by him. The very quest.ion decided in the principal
case arose in Courts v. Clark, 84 Ore. 179· The court held one who sold tires
and put them on an automobile was an automobile repairer within the terms
of the statute. The theory of the principal case that the work performed
must be such as requires a skilled mechanic is technical and seems out of
harmony with the spirit of the statutes.
BANKRUP'tCY-FALSS REPRSS'SN'rA'rlONS TO

CoMMSRCIAL

AGSNCY AS BAR

TO D1scHARGS.-Plaintiff opposed the defendants' discharge in bankruptcy be-

cause they had given a commercial agency a materially false :financial statement in writing. Three months thereafter plaintiff, before extending credit,
had asked the agency for a report on defendants and relied upon the false
statement which it had supplied. The printed form upon which the statement was written recited that it was made "as a basis of credit'', but the re-
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port had not been procured at the request of any creditor nor was there any
apparent purpose of getting goods from any particular dealer on the strength
of it. Held, that the discharge could not be denied. J. W. Ould Co. v. Davis
et al., (C. C. A., 4th Circ., 1917), 246 Fed. 228.
Sec. 14b of the BANKRUP'tCY Ar::r, as amended in 1910, reads: "The judge
shall * * * discharge the applicant unless he has * * * (3) obtained money
or property on credit upon a materially false statement in writing made by
him to any person or his representative for the purpose of obtaining credit
from such person." As applied to materially false statements in writing
made to a commercial agency, there has been some conflict of opinion, although all of the cases may perhaps be distinguished on their facts. Where
a discharge has been denied, there has generally been shown a clear intention
to defraud; while in the cases that have allowed a discharge, there has been
no such intention apparent. Judged by this standard the principal case is
unexceptional, since the words of the printed form can hardly establish any
definite intention to defraud. The court's opinion, however, sets up no such
distinction. The intention of Congress at the time the amendment was passed
is sought in the report of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate. The House
of Representatives had passed an amendment which clearly denied discharge
in case the bankrupt had made to a commercial agency materially false statements which were relied on by the creditor. As the Senate Committee considered this too harsh, the present provision was substituted. In its report
the committee says, "It is a sufficient ground of opposition to discharge that
the bankrupt has obtained property from a creditor by a materially false
statement in writing where that statement was specifically asked for by the
creditor or the creditor's representative." On this account the court in the
principal case finds itself unable to construe § 14b (3) so as to cover "general statements to mercantile agencies, not specifically asked for by p_rospective customers." In re R1issell, 176 Fed. 253; In re Zoffer, 2n Fed. 936.
This view, then, would refuse a discharge only when the statements had
been asked for by the commercial agency as the actual representative of the
objecting creditor; if such fact appeared, however, the discharge would be
denied even though the fact of the request had been unknown to the bankrupt and even though he may not have had any specific intention to defraud.
In re Carton & Co., 148 Fed. 63. On the other hand, in cases where a false
statement is given to a commercial agency which is not at the time acting as
the representative of a prospective creditor, a discharge is allowed even
though there is an intention to defraud generally, and logically from the
·words of the committee, a discharge should be allowed even if there is an
intention to defraud a particular person. Opinions based on a literal interpretation of the statute-a second view-consider the 1910 amendment· as
broadening the scope of the previous provision which denied discharge if the
bankrupt had "obtained property on credit from any person upon a materially false statement in writing made to such person for the purpose of obtaining such prop~rty on credit." In re Simon, 201 Fed. 1004; contra, In re
Pinsker, 25 Am. B. R. 494- Under this provision some courts had denied
discharge on the ground that the commercial agency was the agent of the
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creditor; since 1910, they consider the addition of the words "or representative'' as a direct legislative sanction of that view. In re Kyte, 174 Fed. 867;
In re Cloutier Bros., 228 Fed. 56g. A third view makes discharge depend on
whether the bankrupt makes the commercial agency his agent for circulating
the false report. In re Dresser, 146 Fed. 383; In re Pinws, 147 Fed. 621;
In re Augspurger, ~81 Fed. 174; In re Foster, 186 Fed. 254; Novick v. Reed,
192 Fed. 20; In re Haimowich, 232 Fed. 378; Haimowich v. Ma1idel, 243 Fed.
338. This theory alone can account for the denial of a discharge where the
creditor was not, at the time the false statement was made, a subscriber to
the commercial agency.
B:ru.s AND Non;:s-AccaTANO: BY Tr:t£GRAPH-Stn1FICIENCY.-An intending purchaser of a draft drawn upon defendant bank, sent a telegram to the
defendant bank asking if it would pay a draft of a certain description to
which the defendant replied, also by telegram, "the draft is good.''. The
draft was assigned to the plaintiff who now sues defendant on its alleged
acceptance. . Held, the above answer was not an acceptance nor an agreement to accept. Colcord v. Banco de Tamaulipas, (Sup. Ct., 1918), 168 N. Y.
s. 710.
The drawee of a bank check cannot be held liable upon a claimed contract
of acceptance external to the bill; unless the language used clearly and unequivocally imports an absolute promise to pay. First Nat. Bank of Atch~
son v. Commercial Savings Bank, 74 Kan. 6o6. It is not disputed that a
valid acceptance of commercial paper may be made by telegraph. Whilden
v. Merchants and Planters Nat. Bank, 64 Ala. 1; Coffman v. Campbell and Co.,
87 Ill. g8; Garrettson v. North Atchison Bank, 39 Fed. !63. The answer
"Yes" to an inquiry whether checks were good, was held not to constitute
an acceptance in Kahn v. Walton, 46 Ohio St. 195· In case of Meyers v. The
Union Nat. Bank, 27 Ill. App. 254, in response to an inquiry whether checks
would be paid if presented on a certain date, the answer was, "Drafts named
are good now." The court held that here was no acceptance and in so deciding placed much emphasis on the use of the word "now." But in Gar- .
rettson v. North Atchison Bank (supra) a telegraphic response "Tate is
good. Send on your paper" in answer to telegram asking a bank if it would
pay it was held to be an acceptance on the ground that it could not be supposed that the bank intended to return an ambiguous answer for purpose of
misleading the party asking the question and held that if the answer were
limited to· the words, "Tate is good" there would be grounds for holding that
the bank intended an affirmative answer to the categorical question. We have
then only the dictum of the above case to oppose the principal case in its
decision, but the reasoning of the Garrettson case appears to be the most
logical, since the inquiry was not as to the validity of the draft or as to the
sufficiency of. the account of the depositor.
CA.RRIItRs-CARRIAGt OF p ASStNGI-:RS - lNl'l'IAL CA.RRIItR- CoNNtCTlONS. The plaintiffs in error, as receivers, through their agent sold decedent, Barber, a two-coupon ticket from Toledo to Piqua, via their own lines, and from
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Piqua to Columbus, pia the Pennsylvania lines. The ticket contained a stipulation that "this company acts only as agent and is not responsible beyond
its own lines". When Barber arrived at Piqua, he was given an inter-depot
transfer ticket, entitling him to be carried to the Pennsylvania station.
Through negligence of the motor car driver Barber was killed. Held, plaintiffs in error were liable for the negligence of the motor car driver, the provision that the initial carrier should not be liable beyond its own lines relating to other railroad transportation, Harmon v. Barber, (C. C. A., 6th Circ.,
1918), 247 Fed. l.
·
In England the doctrine is that the initial carrier is liable for injuries· to
passengers occurring on the lines of connecting carriers, Buxton v. N. E.
Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 549; Great Western Ry. v. Blake, 7 H: &. N. 987;
Thomas v. Rhymney Ry., L. R. 6 Q. B. 266. And this view has been taken
in some American courts, Central Ry. v. Coombs, 70 Ga. 533. The general rule
in the United States in the absence of special contract is that the initial carrier
acts as agent of the connecting lines, Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Jones, 155 U.
S. 333; Brook v. Brooklyn U. E. R. Co., 133 N. Y. S. 253; Brooke v. Grand
Trunk R. Co., 15 Mich. 332; Pennsylvania Co. v. Loftis, 72 Oh. St. 288. The
usual method when issuing coupon tickets is for the initial carrier to state
expressly on the ticket that it acts as agent of other carriers. In such cases
each coupon is considered a distinct contract by each road and each road
is liable for its own negligence, Clark v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co.,
(Tex. Civ. App., l9II), 137 S. W. 716; Auerbach v. N. Y. C. &c. Ry. Co.,
8g N. Y. 281; Knight v. Portland, S. & P. R. Co., 56 Me. 234; Young v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 115 Pa. n2; Cowen v. Winters, g6 Fed. 929; Mosher
v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 127 U. S. 390. The English doctrine of holding
the initial carrier liable for the negligence of connecting carriers causing injuries to passengers was an extension of the doctrine which held th~ initial
carrier liable for loss of luggage through the negligence of connecting carriers, Muschamp v. Lancaster & P. J. R. Co., 8 Mees. & Wets. 421; Watson
v. A. N. & B. Ry. Co., 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 497; Mytton v. Midland R. Co., 4
Hurl. & N. 615. In America the Carmack Amendment allows the passenger
to recover from the initial carrier for loss of goods or luggage caused by
the negligence of the connecting carrier, but there has been no similar legislation in regard to personal injuries to passengers. Not only are railroads
considered common carriers of passengers, but also stage coaches, McKinney
v. Neil, I McLean (U. S.) 540; hacks, Bance v. Dub11que St. R. Co., 53 Ia.
278; jitneys, Memphis v. State ex rel. Ryals, 133 Tenn. 83; taxicabs, Van
Hoeffen v. Colitmbia Taxicab Co., 179 Mo. App. 591, and transfer companies,
Fields v. Holland, 158 Ky. 544, that carry all indiscriminately for :\ reasonable charge have been held to the same degree of care as that due from the
railroads. The initial carrier is not bound to carry passengers beyond the
limits of its own lines, but it may contract for the whole trip, including connecting carriers, and thus make itself liable for the negligence of connecting
carriers, Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306; Chi. & A. R.R. Co. v. Dmnser,
l6I Ill. 190; Wheeler v. S. F. & A. Ry. Co., 31 Cal. 46. In the instant case
it was decided that the initial carrier assumed the duty of transporting the
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decedent Barber from its station to the Pennsylvania station. Because the
original ticket contained no coupon for inter-station transfer and the initial
carrier paid the compensation for such transfer, the limitation in the original
ticket that the "company was not responsible beyond its own lines" could not
exemJ;>t the company from liability for the negligence of the inter-station
transfer company's_ driver. Similarly, in Bufjett v. Troy & B. R. Co., 40
N. Y. 168, where the railway hired a stage coach to bring its intending passengers from the village to the depot, the railway was held liable for the
stage driver's negligence. And a hotel keeper, who furnished a bus to carry
his guests without charge from the station to the hotel, was held liable for
injuries to a guest resulting from the negligence of the driver, Barker v.
Pollock, 26 Can. L. T. 182.
CARRlllRs-SuFFICitNCY OF Nor1cs OF Loss-WAIVJ::R.-Carloads of berries
shipped over defendant's road were received in damaged condition and examined by defendant's agent in company with the consignee. An inspection
report was made by the agent as well as a notation on the freight receipt,
of the extent of the damage. After such examination plaintiff sent to defendant a written notice reading "Consignee will file a claim'' etc. Held, that such
notice, though in the future tense, was sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of the uniform bill of lading approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission that claims for loss or damages be made in writing within four months.
Further such a proviso was waived by· defendant's action in conducting negotiations anent the claim without other formal notice. E. H. Emrry & Co.
v. Wabash R. Co., (Iowa, 1918), 166 N. W. 6oo.
The instant case is an illustration of the courts' tendency to coosider the
spirit rather than the letter of the law on the subject of interstate commerce,
and more particularly in the construction of the uniform bill of lading, providing for a written claim within a stated period. Substantial compliance
has been repeatedly upheld. For example a telegram announcing consignee's
intention to sue was deemed sufficient in Georgia, Fla., & Ala. R. R. v. Blish
Milling Co., 241 U.S. lgo; and Shark v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 164 N. W.
39 (N. D.) so considered an oral claim acted upon by the company, as did
So. Pac. Ry. v. Stewart, 233 Fed. 956. Though the bill of lading expressly
directed such notice to be given to a specified agent, a letter to a different
agent was held effective in Ill. Central R.R. v. Bauer, II4 Miss. 516. In view
of the court's decision as to the sufficiency of the notice, the question of
waiver becomes unimportant. The state courts are inclined to allow such ·
waiver; see Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Rudy, 173 Ind. 181, Gilliland
v. So. R. Co., 85 S. C. 26 and Watkins Mdse. Co. v. Mo., Kan., and Texas R.
Co., 82 Kan. 3o8. However when the question has been touched upon in the'
United States Courts, they have declared against waiver as tending to discrimination a12d thus repugnant to the spirit of the Interstate Commerce Commission Acts. It should be observed that these utterances are largely dicta,
and are directed towards attempted waivers which will release the -carrier,
rather than the shipper, from liability. Cf. the Blish case supra and Mo.,
Kn. and Tex. R. Co. v. Ward, 37 Sup. Court 617.
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CoMM£Rct-F:£DERAI. EMPI.OY:£Rs' LIAllILITY ACT-EMPLOY.M:£N'l' IN "INT£RS'l'AT:£ CoMMr:RCt."-The plaintiff was a section foreman of the defendant
with the duty of keeping the tracks in repair. Acting under instructions, he
was on his way to repair a washout supposed to be on the main track, but
was injured before he arrived there. It later appeared that the washout was
on a spur track owned by a different corporation. Held, that the jury might
infer that at the time of his injury he was engaged in interstate commerce
within the EMPI.OYr:Rs' LIAllILI'l'Y ACT, April 22, 1go8, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, (U.
S. Comp. St. 1913, secs. 8657-8665), Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Tomlinson, (Ga.
App. 1918), 94 S. E. 909.
In order for the plaintiff to recover he must show that the carrier was
engaged in interstate commerce and that he was employed therein, Pedersen
v. Dela1.1Jare, L. & W. Ry., 229 U. S. 146. To determine whether the employee is "employed in such commerce" the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 47, did not particularize, but contented itself with the broad doctrine that the employment
must have a real or substantial connection with interstate commerce. The
nature of the work being done at the time of the injury and its effect on
interstate commerce is to be considered, Lamphere v. Oregon R. & Nav.
Co., lg6 Fed. 336. But each case is to be decided in the light of its particular
facts, N. Y. Cent. •& H. R. R. Co. v. Carr, 238 U. S. 200, 263. In accord
with these views it has been held that one engaged in repairing interstate
tracks comes within the act, Zikos v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 179 Fed. 8g3;
Jones v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 149 Ky. 566. If the railway accept freight
on through bills of lading, though its tracks be entirely within the state,
an employee engaged in repairing the tracks can recover under the act,
Cholerton v. Detroit, J. & C. Ry., (Mich., 1917), 165 N. W. 6o6; 16 MICH.
L. RF.v. 385. But an employee working on a private spur, In re Liberti, 167
N. Y. S. 478, or doing local work on a short branch leading to a ·private
smelter, Southern Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 9 Ga. App. 190, is not entitled to protection of the Act. An engineer injured on his way to the roundhouse where
he was to take out an interstate train, Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Rentz, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1913), 162 S. W. 959, and an employee riding on a hand car furnished by the railroad to his work of pumping water for interstate trains,
Horton v. Oregon-Wash. R. & Nav. Co., 72 Wash. 503, have been held entitled to recover under the Act. In the instant case, however, the court extends the scope of the Act to include an employee who thinks he is on his
way to engage in interstate commerce, but who would not have been engaged
in interstate commerce if he had been sent to the spur track and no error
had been made. What will be the next step?
CoMM:£RC£-lN'l':£RS'l'AT:£ TRANSPOR'l'A'l'ION-IN'l'OXICA'l'ING LIQUORS.- Petitioner was convicted of violating the prohibition laws of the state of Alabama, by having in his possession a large quantity of intoxicating liquors,
while driving along the public roads of the state in an automobile. It appeared, and tlie petitioner set it up as a defense, that the carrying of the
liquors in question was a part of an interstate shipment. Held, that the state
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prohibition statutes, as extended by the W£BB-~NYON Acr, March l, 1913,
c. go, 37 Stat. 6gg (U.S. Comp. St. 1916, sec. 8739), were inapplicable to such
an interstate shipment. Moragne v. State, (Ala., 1917), 77 So. 322.
In the trial court and on appeal, in the instant case, it was held that the
effect· of the Alabama prohibition statutes, in connection with the W£BBKl:NYON BILL, maqe the carrying of such liquors along the state highways,
though the carrying be merely through the state as a necessary part of an
interstate routing, a violation of the Alabama prohibition statutes. The Supreme Court did not so construe the state and federal statutes. It held
that the state statutes did not apply, were never intended to apply, and
would be unconstitutional and void if they did apply, to such an interstate
carrying or possession of such goods, for the sole purpose of transportation;
and that the W£BB-~NYON BILL did not have the effect of extending the
statutes to such a case. The broadest scope which any cases have given to
the Wi;:BB-~NYON Acr is that it prohibits the shipment or transportation of
liquor from one state into another, either when it is intended to be sold
in violation .of any law of the latter state, or when it is to be received, possessed, or used, in any manner, in violation of the state law; but ·no case
has ever held, and the instant case expressly holds to the contrary, that it
was intended to apply to interstate shipments of liquors, where the liquors
are merely passing through the state, and are not bought, sold, possessed,
stored, or used there in any manner. For full notes on the construction and
effect of the W£BB-Ki;:NYON BILL, see: L. R. A., 1916C, 299; L. R. A. 1917B,
1229.
CoNSTITU'tIONAI. LAW-ARMY AND NAVY-F~M: oF 'tltt Pmtss.-A state
statute made it a criminal offense to advocate that men should not enlist in
the military forces or aid in prosecuting the war. H eltJ, circulating a pamphlet which impugns the motives of the President and Congress in entering
into the war and seeking by unfounded assertions to incite antagonism to
the war, the natural tendency of which is to defer enlistments, is a violation
of .the statute, which is constitutional. State v. Holm, (Minn., 1918), 166
N. W. 181.
The defense in this case was that the statute was unconstitutional because
it conflicted with section 8 of article I of the Federal Constitution, giving
Congress power to raise and maintain an army and because it abridges freedom of speech secured by the 14th Amendment. Further the defendant contended that this statute had been superseded and abrogated by the Espionage
Law of June 15, 1917. The defendant proceeded on the ground that the
power to raise armies and make all laws necessary for carrying conferred
powers into effect is exclusive and that this statute is in conflict. Even assuming that the power is exclusive it is hard to see how this act trenches upon
the power of.the national government. The court held that in enacting it as
a police regulation the legislature was well within its province. A law of
the state of Illinois prohibiting any body of men other than the tmutia of
the state and the troops of the United States from drilling or parading without a license from the governor is constitutional. Presser v. People of Illi-
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nois, n6 U. S. 252. A statute of Pennsylvania providing that a member of
the militia o"f the state, who was called into the services of the United States
and who refused to obey such call, should be tried by a state court martial
is valid. Houst01i v. Moore, 18 U.S. (S Wheat) I. It was not shown in this
case that the statute was in conflict with the Espionage Law. Concerning a
similar situation it is said in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, that Congress
may make regulations on the same subject or may alter or add to those already made; the paramount character of thos·e made by Congress has the
effect to supersede those made by the state so far as the two are inconsistent,
and no farther. As to the defense of the conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, that is still a mooted question. There is no doubt, however, that at a
time like this such an act would be sustained because of the great importance
of the public safety. The court said, "The United States is at war and we
think the legislature did not exceed its power."
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-S~£D GRAIN LAw-LoANS 'tO FARMtRS.-The state
constitution provided that the several counties of the state shall provide as
may be prescribed by law, for those inhabitants who by reason of age, infirmity or other misfortune may have claims upon the sympathy and aid of
society. Held, a law providing for loans upon certain conditions to farmers
who are unable to secure seed is for a public purpose and constitutional.
State ex rel. Cryderman v. Wienrich, (Mont., 1918), 170 Pac. 942.
The question involved in cases of this kind is whether this is a -loaning
of the public credit for a private purpose. Taxation cannot be imposed for
a private purpose and if the state can appropriate for a private purpose the
money in its treasury and then replace it by taxation it can do indirectly what
it cannot do directly. That one is not a proper subject of relief until he is
actually a pauper was held in State ex rel. Griffith v. Osawkee Twp., g Kan.
418. A statute authorizing the city of Boston to issue bonds and lend the
proceeds on mortgage to the owners of land, the buildings upon which were
destroyed by the great fire of 1872 was unconstitutional. Lowell v. City of
Boston, III Mass. 454. The Supreme Court of the United States has decided
that a statute authorizing a town to issue its bonds in aid of a manufacturing
enterprise is invalid. Loan Assoc. v. Topeka, 20 Wall 655. Apparently the
only state in which public aid to a privately owned railroad is not allowed in
Michigan. People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452. A statute appropriating money to
be loaned to farmers except those having more than I6o acres free from
incumbrance, for the purpose of buying seed grain, appropriate public money
for a private use and is unconstitutional. William Deering & Co. v. Peterson,
75 Minn. n8. The contrary view is upheld in State v. Nelson Co., l N. D. 88.
In this last mentioned case the distress was widespread. Every case of this
kind must stand on its own peculiar facts. This decision seems correct in
view of the enormous demand for food products in all parts of the world.
It is simply a war measure. Otherwise the case would seem to be parallel
with Lowell v: Bosto1i, and a different decision should be reached. See
Pen11sylvania R. Co. v. United States, 246 Fed. 881, which laid emphasis on
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the fact that since the United States was at war and great demands were
being made upon its transportation systems, it could not be said as a matter
of law that. defendant had violated the Hours of Service Act.
CRIMINAL LAw-Evm1m~ oF OTHt.~ OntNCl!:S-ADMissmILITY.-On a trial
for conducting a hotel as a disorderly house, in order to show the bad and
discredited character of D's housekeeper, a witness in his behalf, and hence
to impeach her credibility, the court admitted her testimony on cross-examination, which was to the effect that she had entered and remained in D's employment at various hotels, with knowledge that he had maintained such
hotels as disorderly houses and had been convicted therefor. Held, on appeal, that it was error to admit such testimony. People v. Richardson, (N.
Y., I9l7), n8 N. E. 514.
It seems clear that such evidence does not come within the purview of
the general rule which permits the introduction of evidence of one's bad
character for truth and veracity in order to discredit a witness. And, according to the prevailing doctrine, evidence of the witness' bad general character is inadmissible for this purpose. I GREENLEAF, Ev., 46I a. But this rule
assumes a relaxed form when the impeaching testimony is elicited on crossexamination of the witness himself, where the range of evidence admissible
for the purpose of discrediting is very liberal and defined only by the discretion of the trial judge. 2 WlGMORF,, Ev. 944- Thus, it has been held that questions
affecting the general character of the witness are not fucompetent on crossexamination. Brockett v. N. J. Steamboat Co., I8 Fed. I56; State v. Pugsley,
75 Iowa 742; State v. Kent, 5 N. D. 5I6, semble. Contra: State v. Houx, I09
Mo. 654; Pratt v. Rawson, 40 Vt. I83. The witness may be interrogated as
to his particular traits of character or habits, chastity, and occupation. Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 44; Johnston v. Farmer.s' Fire Ins. Co., I06 Mich. ¢;
State v. Merriman, 34 S. C. 16; People v. Webster, I39 N. Y. 73; People v.
Giblin, II5 N. Y. lg6; Boles v. State, 46 Ala. 204; State v. Coella, 3 Wash.
99; Thompso1i v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 5n. Contra: People v. Un Dong, lo6
Cal. 83; State v. Gleim, 17 M:ontn7; State v. Weems, 96 Iowa 426; Howel v.
Com., 5 Grat. 664. A comprehensive array of cases establishes the rule that
a witness may be asked concerning particular acts or facts. Oxier v. U. S.,
l Ind. T. 85; State v. Hack, n8 Mo. 92; People v. Williams, 92 Hun. 354;
State v. Mart:h, 46 N. C. 526; IJaker v. Trotter, 73 Ala. 277. Contra: Thiede
v. Utah, 1$9 U. S. 510; Holbrook v. Dow, 78 Mass. 357; Bessette v. State, IOI.
Ind. 85; State v. TV ooderd, 20 Iowa 54I. These cases indutiably indicate that
the interrogation of a witness on cross-examination is permissible, if, within
the judgment of the trial court, such is relevant to the inquiry concerning
the witness' credulity; so it seems that on this score there was no error in
admitting th¥ housekeeper's testimony. But the court went on the theory
that "the evidence was inadmissible, not because it did not legitimateJy tend
to prove an immoral and discredited character of the witness, but because
illegitimately and beyond obviation it would subject the defendant to the
prejudice and injustice which the reasons declare and condemn". The sec-
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ond question then simply is whether, conceding the evidence was admissible
to impugn the witness' credit, it was rendered inadmissible because it was
apt to be prejudicial to D. It is unquestionably the rule that evidence of the
bad character of the defendant is inadmissible, except to rebut evidence of
good character introduced by him, unless the defendant has testified in his
own behalf, which would subject him to the same impeachment as any other
witness. See GREENLEAF, Ev., 14b; I WIGMORE, Ev., 57, 58; I Jom:s, Ev., I48a.
In the instant case, D. introdu{:ed no evidence of his good character, nor did
he testify in his own behalf, so that the scope of that rule could not justify
its admission; and it seems that it was on this theory that the instant case
was decided. The court apparently disregarded the rule, equally well established, that evidence inadmissible for one purpose will not be thereby rendered inadmissible for another purpose. See I WIGMORJ;!, Ev., I3; I JoNts,
Ev., I73, p. 895.
CRIMINAL LAw-PRESUMP'l'IONS-CHARAC'tER OF DC:Fr:NDANT.-Where trial
court refuse to instruct the jury that the defendant was presumed to be a
person of good character and that the supposed presumption should be considered as evidence in favor of the accused, Held, such refusal proper. Greer
v. United States, 38 Sup. Ct. 209.
This judgment upholds a carefully reasoned decision in Price v. United
States, 2I8 Fed. I49, and numerous state cases and text-books; but as another
Circuit Court of Appeal had taken a different view, Mullen v. United States,
Io6 Fed. 8g2, also taken by other cases and text-books it became necessary
for the Supreme Court to settle this doubt. The Supreme Court was of the
opinion that their's was the only reasonable view since a presumption upon
a matter of fact, when it is not merely a disguise for some other principle,
means that common experience shows the fact to be so generally true that
courts may notice the truth. Whatever the scope of the presumption that a
man is innocent of the specific crime charged, it cannot be said that by common experience the character of most people indicted by a grand jury is good.
For authorities and clear d,iscussion of principles involved see I3 MICH. L.

Rev. 504MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO THIRD PERSON-THC: R:eLATION-HIRING
CHAUFF'EUR.-Defendant (for a fixed amount) hired of a company, for his
use, for a period of 3 months, an automobile with a chauffeur, all orders to
be taken from the defendant. While the defendant was riding in the automobile, it struck and killed plaintiff's intestate, as a result of the negligence
of the chauffeur. · Held, that the chauffeur had become pro hac vice the defendant's servant, making defendant liable for the negligent driving. McNamara v. Leipzig, (App. Div., I9I7), I67 N. Y. S. g8I.
The first reported case involving the point involved in the instant case
was Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547, where the owner of a carriage hired
of a stable-keeper a pair of horses to draw the carriage for a day, and the
owner of the horses provided a driver, through whose negligence an injury
was done to a horse belonging to a third person ; and the four members of
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the Court of King's Bench were evenly divided on the question of the liability of the carriage owner to be sued for such injury. The next case involving the point was Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 498, where the owners of a
carriage were accustomed to hire, from a stable-keeper, horses, for a day
or drive; and the owner of the horses provided a driver. The same driver
was always furnished, and the owners of the carriage had a suit of livery
made for him, which he wore while driving for them. The driver's regular
wages came from the stable-keeper. A third party was injured by the driver's negligence, and it was held that the owners of the carriage were not
liable to be sued for such injury. This decision has been recognized and
followed in England. Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 7u; Milliga1i v. Wedge,
12 Ad. & E. 737; Hobbit v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., 4 Welsby, H. & G., 254;
Jones v. Mayor of Liverpool, 14 Q. B. D. Bgo. The doctrine of the English
courts has been generally approved and followed by the courts of the United
States. Huff v. Ford, 126 Mass. 24; Driscoll v. Towle, 181 Mass. 416-; Ash
v. Century Lumber Co., 153 Ia. 523 (containing a thorough discussion of the
cases); Frerker v. Nicholso1i, 41 Colo. 12; Joslin v. Grand Rapids Ice Co.,
50 Mich. 516; Higham v. Waterman Co., 32 R. I. 578; Morris v. Trudo, 83
Vt. 44; Little v. Hackett, n6 U. S. 366; Standard Oil Co. v. A11derso1~, 212
U. S. 215. The New York courts appear to have had some difficulty in determining the questions raised by this class of cases, but seem to have concluded to draw a line of distinction between those cases in which the employee
is exclusively at the service of the hirer, and those cases in which the employee is at the service of others as well as that of the hirer; making the
hirer. liable, as his master, in the former class, and the general employer in
the latter. Lewis v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N. Y. 52; Kellogg v. Church
Charity Foundation, 203 N. Y. 191; Schmedes v. Deffaa, 214 N. Y. 675 (reversing 153 App. Div. 819) ; Hartell v. Simonson, 218 N. Y. 345. The court
in the instant case divided three to two. There is no dispute as to the proper
test to be applied, which, all courts agree, is: whose work is being done,
and who, during the course of the work, has or exercises control of the
doing of the work. The conflict comes in the attempts to apply the test.
The majority in the instant case held that it was the defendant's work that
was being done, and that he had control of the doing of it; while the minority was of the opinion that it was the general employer's work that was being
done, and that it had control of the doing of it.
CHn.D-lNJURY FROM Acr: OF CHn.D-NllGJ.lGJ;N~ OF PARr:NT
}URY.-The defendant, owner of a gun for which he no longer had any
use, broke the stock, leaving however the operative parts intact, and threw
it under his bed, intending to conceal it there, from his children. The gun
was found by his son, a boy of about thirteen years, who knew of his father's
possession of the gun, but who had never been given any instruction as to
the danger of its use, and who was ignorant of the fact that it was still
loaded. The son repaired the gun stock and in play shot the plaintiff, who
brings suit by his father as next friend for injuries sustained thereby against
the defendant. Held, under facts of above case whether defendant was negPARr:NT AND

FOR
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ligent in allowing his son to get possession of a loaded rifle and whether
such negligence was the cause of the injury, were questions for the jury.
Salisbury v. Cruciale, (R. I., I9I8), I02 Atl. 73I.
The rule is well settled that a parent is not liable for the torts of his
child. Chastain v. Johns, I20 Ga. 977. Kumba v. Gilham, I03 Wis. 3I2. But
acts of the parent may be so related to acts of the child as to constitute
negligence in the parent, his acts being the causans of the injury. Palm v.
lvorson, II7 Ill. App. 535. For instance there may be a legal duty upon a
parent towards the general public to guard against a boy obtaining possession
.of guns or other dangerous weapons. Sullivan v. Creed, (I904), 2 Ir. K. B.
D. 3I7. The liability rests on the duty of every man to use his own property
so as not to injure the person or property of others. Carter v. Towne, g8
Mass. 567. In cases of this character the question of the negligence of the
parent is a question for the jury. Brittingham v. Stadiem, I5I N. C. 299;
Silllivan v. Creed, supra; Meers v. McDowell, no Ky. 926; Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426; Phillips v. Barnett, (N. Y.), 2 City Ct. R. 20. But in
Swansoti v. Crandall, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 85 it was held that the discovery of
a revolver in a bureau drawer by a child of five years could not have been
reasonably anticipated and that there was no evidence to go to the jury on
the question of negligence. In Phillips v. Barnett, (N. Y.), (supra)' on
almost the same facts the question of negligence was submitted to the jury.
In Hagerty v. Powers, 66 Cal. 368 it was held that the father of a child
.eleven years old is not liable for negligently allowing him to have a loaded
pistol with which he carelessly shot another child. This case was poorly
decided in that the court totally ignored the question of the father's negligence and based their decision entirely on the theory that a father is not
liable for the torts of the son. A parent is not liable for the tort of his
infant son arising from permitting his son to use fire arms where it ;ippears
that such son was twelve years of age, experienced in the use of fire arms,
acquainted with their construction and proper mode of carrying, handling
and discharging the same and had been habitually careful. Palm v. Ivorson,
(supra).
SAY.ES -IMPLDm W ARRA:N'tY IN SALES 011 FooD. - Defendant, a druggist,
-sold to the plaintiff, for consumption, ice-cream, which he had prepared.
Plaintiff became violently sick after eating it due to the presence in it of a
poison known as tyrotoxicon. Held, defendant was liable on an implied warranty that the ice-cream was fit for human consumption. Race '('. Kriim, (N.
Y., I9I8). n8 N. E. 853.
Whenever special reliance is placed by the vendee on the vendor in the
selection of wholesome food, the courts uniformly hold there is an implied
warranty as to fitness. Bigge v. Parkinson, 7 H. & N. 955; Beer v. Walker,
37 L. T. N. S. 278; Burrows v. Smith, IO T. L. R. 246; Wallis v. Russell
[I902] 2 Ir. R. 585, even though the vendee is a skilled tradesman buying to
sell again, Copas v. The Anglo-American Provision Co., 73 Mich. 54I; Bailey
v. Nickols, 2 Root (Conn.) 407; Trusc11el v. Dea1i, 77 Ark. 546; or if the
food is for animals: Coyle v. Baum, 3 Okla. 695; Deason v. McNeil!, I33 Ill.
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App. 304; or where the contract is executory, and the vendee has no opportunity to examine the goods until delivery: Armour v. Gundersheimer, 23
App. Cas. (D. C.) 2Io; Bigge v. Parkinson (supra). But there is no warranty if the vendee is a trader not relying on the judgment of the vendor:
Humphreys v. Comline, 8 Black£. (Ind.) SI6; Jones v. Murray,.3 T. B. Mon.
(Ky.) 83; Zielinski v. Potter, (Mich., I9I7), I61 N. W. 8s1; Emerson v.
Brigham, IO Mass. I97; Hanson v. Hartse, 70 Minn. 282; Moses v. Mead,
s Den. (N. Y.) 6I7; Goldrich v. Ryan, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 324; Needham v. Dial, 4 Texas Civ. App. I4I. But where, as in the principal case, the
vendor was the manufacturer or producer, and he sells directly to the consumer the warranty is always implied, and he sells at his peril. 3 Bl. Com.,
16S; Moore v. McKinley, S Calif. 47I, (dictum); Moses v. Mead (supra)
(dictum); Flessher v. The Carstens Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48; Getty v.
Rountree, 2 Chandler (Wis.) 28 (dictum). The same rule prevails under
the civil law. Doyle v. Fuerst and Kraemer, 129 La. 838, go6; Ann. Cases,
I9IS B, IIIO, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 48o. In the following cases it was held
there was an implied warranty where the vendor was not the maker of the
food products. Wiedemaii v. Keller, 17I Ill. 93; ,(1.skam v. Platt, 8s Conn.
448; Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., IS7 N. Y. Supp. s61; Leahy v. Essex Co., 148
N. Y. Supp. Io63. It did not appear in this case whether the· defendant, a
restaurant keeper, had made the pie or not. But see Farrell v. The Manhattan Market Co., Ig8 Mass. 27I, 126 Am. St. Rep. 436, IS L. R. A. (N. S.) 884;
where a retailer was held not liable to a consumer on an implied warranty
that a chicken he sold her was wholesome food. In that case, however, the
vendee selected the chicken herself. In Chapman v. Roggenkamp,. I82 !11.
App. u7, it was held the warranty was implied that the peas were fit for consumption, in a sale of canned peas by a retailer to a consumer. But see
Bigelow v. The Maine Cent. R.R., IIO Me. 10s; Julian v. Laubenberger, 16
Misc. (N. Y.) 646, (contra). Where the vendor is not a regular dealer there
is no implied warranty: Burnby v. Bollett, 16 M. & W., 644; Emmerton v.
Mathews, 7 H. & N. s86; Smith v. Baker, 40 L. T. N. S. 261; Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., (supra) (dictum); Hoover v. Peters, I8 Mich. SI (contra) nor is a warranty implied where the food is bought for immediate consumption by animals: Nat'l Cotton Oil Co. v. Young, 74 Ark. 144 4 Ann.
Cas. u23; Lukens v. Freiund, 27 Kan. 664; Houk v. Burg (Tex.) IOS S. W.
n76; Houston Cotton Oil Co. v. Trammell, (Tex. Civ. App.), 72 S. W. 244There is no principle which will reconcile all the cases. In Winsor v. Lombard, 18 Pick. (Mass.) S7, Shaw, C. J., said that the retail vendor of food·
for domestic consumption is from the nature of his calling presumed to know
whether a given article is sound and wholesome. This principle is made the
basis of many decisions. See note, IS L. R. A. (N. S.) 884 It does not,
however, account for Chapman v. Roggmkemp, (supra), nor Hoover v.
Peters, (sups). In the former case it was said; ''Where, however, arti<:les of food are purchased from a retail dealer for immediate consumption,
the consequences resulting from the purchase of an unsound article may be
so serious and may prove so disastrous to the health and life of the consumer that public safety demands that there should be an implied warranty

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS

557

on the part of the vendor that the article sold is sound and fit for the use
for which it was purchased." This doctrine will not reconcile all the cases,
though they all seem to follow the one rule or the other.
SAI.ts-SAI;E FOR "CASH ON DF.r.IVF:RY"-PASSING OF TITr.t.-F. made a bid
for cotton brought to market by H., and left instructions to have the cotton
ginned at a certain gin, if his bid was accepted. H. accepted the bid and
took the cotton to the gin. About this time, exactly when does not appear,
the plaintiff, a judgment creditor of H., garnished F. as having in his hands
money due to H. F. returned the cotton, and justifies his act on two grounds,
one being that the sale to him was for cash on delivery, and since he had not
yet paid for the cotton, the title to it remained in H. Held, defense good,
that where a sale is for cash on delivery no title passes to vendee until payment of the purchase price. Hamra Bros. v. Herrell, (Mo., 1918), 200 S. W.
776.

It is a presumption of the law of sales, that in contracts for the sale of
specific goods in which nothing remains to be done but the making of delivery or paying of the purchase price, or both, title passes immediately to the
vendee. Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn. & Cress. 36o; Clark v. Greeley, 62 N. H.
394 This presumption may, of course, be overcome by showing the intent
of the parties that title shall remain in the vendor until such time as they desire. The court in the principal case holds, that as a matter of law, the making of the terms of the sale "cash on delivery'' rebuts the presumption of
immediate passage of title, and makes the payment of the purchase price a
condition precedent to such passage. The use of the term "cash on delivery''
here is rather unfortunate. The great majority of cases where goods are
sent "C. 0. D." by common carrier hold that title passes on delivery to the
carrier, and the payment of the price is merely a condition precedent to the
delivery of possession. Commo11wealth v. Flemi11g, 130 Pa. 138; Pilgreen v.
State, 71 Ala. 368. But see La11e v. Chadwick, 146 Man. 68. Missouri also
has taken this view, State v. Rosenberger, 212 Mo. 648, cited with approval
in State ex rel. Weatherby v. Brewing Co., 270 Mo. 100; State v. Palmer, 170
Mo. App. 90. In these cases the m~aning of "C. 0. D." is, apparently, primarily "collect on delivery''. But it also has the connotation "cash on delivery". Newhook v. Ryan, 9 New£. 220. Yet the courts, when using the full
term "cash on delivery'', rather than the abbreviation "C. 0. D.", tend to
apply it to cases where the shipment is not by carrier, and to use it as synonymous with "cash sale". See Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H. 1361 where the payment was to be made in person to the vendor, and Boyd v. Bank of Mercer
Cou11ty, 174 Mo. App. 431, where a check was to be mailed to the seller.
'I'he tendency in these cases is to consider the payment of the purchase price
a condition precedent to the passage of title, not merely of possession.
Leven v. Smith, l Denio (N. Y.) 571; Pinkham v. Appleton, 82 Me. 574The distinction is clearly marked as running throughout the Missouri cases,
State v. Rosenberger, S1epra, being cited as the law in C. 0. D. by carrier cases,
and holding that title passes and possession merely is held up; and JohnsonBrink111an Co. v. Central Bank, n6 Mo. 558, in the others, of "cash on deliv-
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ery" without the intervention of the common carrier as an agent of collection.
See Skinner and Kennedy Stationery Co. v. Lammert Furnitiire Co., 182 Mo.
App. 549; Boyd v. Bank of Mercer County, supra. Commercial usage and
the courts seem to have well established this line of cleavage in apparently
analogous cases. The matter is discussed by Henderson, J.; in Keller v.
State (Tex.) 87 S. W. 669, who comments on the restriction of the meaning
of "C. 0. D." to small packages sent by common carrier, and says that the
doctrines of the two types of cases are too well established to change either
to conform to the other. The use of the term "cash sale" instead of "cash
on delivery'' where the transaction is between the parties themselves, would
remove much of the mist in which the subject is enveloped.
ScHooLs AND SCHOOL D1sTRIC'l's-Foimm111NG PuPIL's ATTENDANct AT MovING PxcruR:Es.-The governing authorities of a public school established a
rule prohibiting the attendance by pupils at any show, moving picture· show
or social function on any school night, eicepting Friday night. Certain pupils, with the consent of their parents, violated the rule by attending a moving picture show on one of the forbidden nights, and were threatened with
expulsion unless they and their parents should agree to observe the regulation in the future. The parents filed a petition for an injunction against the
proposed enforcement of the rule. Held, the injunction should be denied,
the rule relating to attendance at moving picture shows being a reasonable
exercise of the school board's discretionary power of discipline. Mangum
et al. v. Keith, (Ga., 1918), 95 S. E. I.
The power of school authorities over pupils is not confined to the school
room or school grounds, but may affect their conduct after they have reached
home. Mr:cH:EY, PtrnLIC OFFICERS, § 730. The extent to which their regulations may go ·is subject to some conflict. Thus, it has been held that a
school board has power to exclude a child of immoral and licentious character, although such character is not manifested by any acts within the school,
Sherman v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 8 Cush. 16o; and that a pupil may
be e..""Cpelled for drunkenness, though not guilty of any misconduct on the
school grounds. Douglass v. Campbell, 89 Ark. 254 Rules forbidding membership in secret societies have been upheld. Wayland v. Hughes, et al, 43
Wash. 441; Wilson v. Board of Edur.ation of Chicago, 233 111. 464 See note,
5 MICH. L. REV. 69. On the other hand, a rule that no pupil should attend
a social fµnction during the school term was held to be beyond the school
board's power, Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286; and a rule requiring all pupils
to remain at home and study from seven to nine o'clock on school nights was
held to be an unwarranted invasion of parental rights to the control of children. Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. 469. These cases limit the power of school
authorities in making regulations to control the child after it has reached
home to matters which would per se have a direct and pernicious effect on
the moral tone of the school, or have a tendency to subvert the proper administration of school affairs. This limitation seems to be well supported by
authority, but the court in the instant case has evidently not seen fit to adhere to it.
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SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-PUBLIC SCHOOL FUNDS-SUPPORT OF PAROCHIAL ScHOOLS.-Plaintiff brought suit to enjoin directors of an incorporated school district from appropriating or paying out public school funds for
the support, aid or maintenance of a parochial school. Held, the injunction
should be granted. Knowlton v. Ba111nhover, (Ia., 1917), 166 N. W. 202.
In this case the evidence showed the study of the Catholic catechism, the
display of emblems, the use of Catholic prayer books and the wearing by the
teachers of robes peculiar to their order. That the Constitution of the United States and state constitutions and statutes prohibit the use of the public
schools for sectarian religious purposes is not disputed. Just when a certain
use comes within the prohibition is not always so clear. The holding of
morning exercises in the public schools, consisting of reading by the teacher
without comment of extracts from the Bible, King James' version, and repeating the Lord's prayer and the singing of appropriate songs in which pupils are not required to join does not amount to sectarian teaching within
the constitutional prohibition. Church v. Bullock, ro4 Texas I. This case
represents the prevailing view and is supported by Pfeiffer v. Board of Education, 118 Mich. 56o; Billard v. Board of Educatio1i, 69 Kan. 53; Hackett
v. Brooksville Graf],ed School District, 120 Ky. 6o8; Donahue v. Richards,
38 Me. 379. The contrary view is reached in People eJ: rel. Ring v. Board
of Education, 245 Ill. 334 and State eJ: rel Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis.
177· A regulation of the department of public instruction prohibiting teachers in public schools from wearing a distinctively religious garb while engaged in the work of teaching is not unrt:asonable. O'Connor v. Hendrick,
184 N. Y. 421. This case was followed in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa.
132. The case of Hysong v. Gallitzin Borough School District, r64 Pa. 629
(18g4) held that persons could not be excluded from the public schools because they wore the garb of a particular religious order. In 1895 the. statute
involved in Commonwealth v. Herr was passed which prohibited the wearing
of such apparel. The holding of parts of graduating exercises of public
schools in churches as well as permitting ministers to deliver prayers is not ·
giving sectarian instruction. State v. District Board, 162 Wis. 482. A contract
between the trustees of a graded school and a sectarian school by which the
sectarian school leased to the graded school two rooms in its school building
and turned over the control and supervision of the graded school to the president of the sectarian institution is a violation of the constituional prohibition against religious use. Williams v. Board of Trustees, Stanto1i Common
School District, 173 Ky. 708. The present case seems to be in accord with
the prevailing view.
SuNDAY LABon-"DAILY NEcr:ss1Ty''.-Appellant operated a moving picture show in a city in close proximity to Fort Roots, one of the national army
cantonments, at which were stationed some five thousand soldiers and eight
thousand laborers. Sunday was practically the only day on which these men
had an opportunity to attend shows or indulge in other forms of recreation.
Appellant, admitting the operation of the show on Sunday, was convicted of
violating a statute prohibiting labor on Sunday other than that of "daily ne-

560

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

cessity, comfort or charity''. Held, the operation of the show was not a
work of necessity within the meaning of that word as employed in the statute. Rosenbaum v. State, (Ark., 1917), 199 S. W. 388.
In most jurisdictions statutes exist specifically prohibiting concerts, shows
and other theatrical performances on Sunday. It has been held, however,
th~t such statutes.do not apply to moving picture shows. People v. Hemleb,
127 App. Div. 356. In the absence of such special statutes, the operation of
theaters has been prevented under statutes similar to that involved in the
instant case. Quarles v. State, 55 Ark. IO; Topeka v. Crawford, .78 Kan. 583.
The same result has been reached with regard to moving picture shows.
State v. Ryan, 8o Conn. 582; Moore v. Owen, 58 Misc. 332. In all these cases
the courts have uniformly rejected the contention that such performances
were works of necessity, and have professedly adhered to the classic definition evolved in Flagg v. Inhabitants of Millbury, 4 Cush. 243, to the effect
that "a moral fitness or propriety of the work and labor done, under the circumstances of any particular case, may well be deemed a necessity within the
statute." Whether, in view of the conditions existing in the present case,
the labor came within the exception might be more open to question than the
court is willing to admit. It must be remembered, however, that the construction and enforcement of these statutes depend in a large measure upon
the state of public sentiment as to the strictness with which the Sabbath
should be observed, and Arkansas has consistently adhered to a severe interpretation of their "blue laws". HARRIS, SUNDAY LAWS,§§ g8-n9.
TAXATION-PUBI,IC PURPOst.-Respondent sought to recover taxes paid
under protest, whicn had been assessed to it under a law for the partial
support of mothers who are dependent upon their own efforts for the support of their children. Under the law, the child must be under fifteen years
of age, living with the mother. The allowance is only to be given when by
means of it the mother will be able to remain at home with her children.
She must in the judgment of the county commissioners or juvenile court be
a proper person for the bringing up of her children. And the allowance
must be necessary to save the child or children from neglect. Held, that the
tax was for a public purpose. De11ver & R. G. R. Co. v. Grand County,
(Utah, 1917), 170 Pac. 74Assumed powers of doubtful legality have gone unchallenged more often
perhaps in this class of cases than in any other. 14 L. R. A. 474, note. In
Baltimore· v. Keeley Institute of Maryland, 81 Md. 106, taxation for treat-.
Jllent of habitual drunkards in a private institution was held constitutional.
Re House, 23 Colo. 87, accord. Wisconsin KeCley Institute Co. v. Milwaukee
County, 95 Wis. 153, contra. A tax for needy blind was held constitutional
in State ex rel. v. Edmondson, 8g Ohio St. 351; but the law must insure the
application of the money to the support of the individual or to prevent him
from becoming a public charge or in some measure to control its use by him.
Davies v. Boyles, 75 Ohio St. II4. 7 L. R. A. (N. S.), ug6. In Hager v.
Kentucky Childre1i!s Home Society, II9 Ky. 235, an appropriation of public
funds to be expended by a private corporation organized to provide homes
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for destitute children was held not to be void as local or special legislation
when it was for the benefit of all children of the class within the state generally. The case seems completely to cover the question here. The object
of the statute in the principal case is clearly to provide for the welfare and
training of the children. 'l'his has too long been a recognized public purpose
to admit of doubt, and the question of whether the mother is as proper a
guardian of the child as a corporation seems too close to admit of judicial
doubt in determining the constitutionality of the tax. The case is undoubtedly stronger than those above, holding taxation for the cure of drunkards
constitutional.
'l'RUS'l'S-WRONGDOER NO'l' PSRMI'l"l'SD 'l'O PROFI'l' BY HIS CRIME-ES'l'A'l'F, BY
EN'l'IRE'l'IES.-One was seised of land by entireties with his wife. He murdered her and killed himself immediately afterwards. The wife's heirs
brought suit in equity to have themselves declared owners of the land. The
husband's heirs defended on the grounds that the murder was not committed
with the intent to get the deceased's property, and that, as it passed by descent and not by will, the law should not deprive them of it. Held, plaintiff's
prayer should be granted; one cannot profit by his own wrongdoing, whether
he takes by descent or by will, and whether he commits the murder with the
intent to enrich himself or with some other felonious design. Van Alstyne v.
Tu/f;y, (N. Y., l9I8), The Daily Record, Feb. 23, I9I8.
Whether a slayer may take or keep the property of his victim has been
much debated in the courts since Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240 (decided
in I888), holding that he may, and Riggs v. Palmer, ns N. Y. 506, which
arose the following year, holding that he may not. The English courts have
had no difficulty with the matter. The one who commits murder or manslaughter can get nothing, Estate of Hall, [1914] Pro. l. The case of In Re
Houghton, (I915), 2 Ch. I73, did allow an insane killer to inherit, but it is
easily reconcilable on the facts, for the slayer was not brought to trial, but
was placed in an insane asylum, and Joyce, J., who wrote the decision, says,
that even "if he had been found guilty of the act, he would not have been
found guilty of any offense." The Roman law origin of the doctrine that
the slayer shall not take, and its development in modern times, are treated
of in 7 MICH. L. Ri;:v., I6o; and in I3 MICH. L. Rsv., 336. New York has
steadfastly held this view since Riggs v. Palmer, supra, though it is not the
weight of authority in the United States. The New York Surrogate Court,
in Matter of Wolf, 88 Misc. (N. Y.) 433, ventured the opinion that unless the
death were caused with intent to profit, the laws of succession should not be
interfered with. That decision is expressly repudiated in the prin.:ipal case.
Tennessee follows the general doctrine of Riggs v. Palmer. See Bo~ v.
Lanier, II2 Tenn. 393. But in a case exactly like the principal case, it allowed the husband's heirs to take the land which had been held by entireties, on the reasoning that persons so seised are seised per tout et non per m;y,
and that to take the property from the survivor would be to exact a forfeiture on commission of a crime, which it could not countenance; Beddingfield
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v. Estill and N ewma11, u8 Tenn. 40. This however, gives the wrongdoer a
surviving interest in property which it is by ne> means certain he would have
gotten but for his crime. A means of avoiding the difficulty is to h~ld the
husband a constructive trustee during his life of the interest which was his
wife's, and on his death to give the entire estate to the heirs· of the wife,
on the presumption that she would have outlived him but for his causing her
death. This theory is advanced by James Barr Ames in 36 AM!lR. L. Rl;G.
and R£v. (N. S.) 225, 238.
WORKMEN'S COMP£NSATION-ADMIRAI.'tY-RJGHT TO COMPENSATION.-Pe-

titioner, a longshoreman in the service of defendants who were stevedores,
was injured while unloading a ship lying at a dock in navigable waters. He
claimed compensation under the state Workmen's Compensation Act. On the
ground that such Acts are not applicable to injuries received while within the
jurisdiction of admiralty the court decided that petitioner should not recover.
On rehearing it was held that under the Amendment of October, 1917 (Act
of Congress October 6, 1917, c. 97, 40 Stat. 395) of the Judicial Code, petitioner should recover. Veasey v. Peters, et al., (La., 1918), 77 So. 948.
The first decision was, of course, based on Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U. S. 205. See comment thereon in 15 MICH. L. Rr:v. 657. The Supreme
Court there held that such state legislation does not extend to navigable
waters over which there is admiralty jurisdiction, and further that a claim
for compensation under the Act is not a "right of a common-law remedy"
within the saving clause of the original judiciary act conferring upon the
Federal District Courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, * * * saving to suitors, in all cases, the
right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give
it." Act, Sept. 24. 1789, c. 20, section g, I Stat. 73, 76. Jud. Code, section 24
(3), 36 Stat. 1087, 1091, c. 231. In October, 1917, Congress amended that act
by adding "And to claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen's
Compensation law of any state". The original decision in the principal case
was announced June 30, 1917. On the rehearing the court considered the
October amendment applicable to the case. In the opinion on rehearing the
court also sought to distinguish the case from the Jensen Case, in that the
proceeding in the earlier case was against the ship while here it was against
individuals. The court was in error in this; the Jensen Case was not a proceeding in. rem. There was a further suggestion that the employment of the
petitioner here was not maritime in nature, so there was no admiralty jurisdiction, and Atlantic Transport Co. v. ltnbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, was explained
on.the ground that there the injured party was loading the ship while here
he was unloading. That distinction the court, however, failed to observe
had been foreclosed by the decision in the Jensen Case where the injured
employee als6 was engaged in unloading.

